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Abstract 
Following the publication of the Commission’s first application report on the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive, this article provides an analysis of the 
provisions regulating the marketing of food and alcoholic beverages to children. After 
examining evidence on the impact of food and alcohol marketing to children, it 
assesses the weaknesses of the Directive’s provisions regulating such practices, 
placing them within the broader context of the Directive and existing EU consumer 
protection and fundamental rights agenda. It concludes that the growing health 
burden of non-communicable diseases in Europe places an onus on the EU to do far 
more to prevent children from being targeted by the alcohol and food industries.  
 
Introduction 
In May 2012, the European Commission published the first report on the application 
of Directive 2010/13, which is intended to promote the free movement of audiovisual 
media services (the AVMS Directive or the Directive).
2
 One of the key issues 
discussed in the report relates to the effectiveness of the provisions of the Directive on 
the marketing of food and alcoholic beverages to children.
3
 
 
During the negotiations that led to the adoption of the AVMS Directive, public health 
and consumer organisations strongly criticised the fact that the Television Without 
                                                          
1
 This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant 
number ES/J020761/1]. 
2
 Directive 2010/13 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of 
audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [2010] OJ L95/1. 
3
 European Commission, Audiovisual Media Services and Connected Devices: Past 
and Future Perspectives COM(2012) 203 final. 
Frontiers Directive
4
 – the predecessor to the AVMS Directive – did not contain any 
significant restrictions on the marketing of alcoholic beverages, whilst being 
completely silent on the marketing of foods and beverages high in fat, trans-fatty 
acids, salt/sodium or sugars, whose excessive intake is not recommended as part of a 
balanced diet (HFSS food). This relative paucity of provisions could perhaps have 
been explained in 1989, when the Television Without Frontiers Directive was first 
adopted, as rather little attention had yet been drawn to childhood obesity concerns 
and the rising incidence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). This is clearly no 
longer the case: NCDs currently account for nearly 86% of deaths and 77% of the 
disease burden in Europe, leading to soaring health, social and economic costs.
5
 This 
is all the more striking as the World Health Organisation (WHO) estimate that up to 
80% of NCDs worldwide could be prevented by eliminating common risk factors 
including unhealthy diets and the abuse of alcohol.
6
 Furthermore, evidence has 
accumulated in the last ten years that marketing for alcoholic beverages and HFSS 
food is associated with unhealthy lifestyles and is regarded as one factor in the 
growing burden of NCDs in Europe. Thus, even if the EU legislature eventually 
decided against banning the marketing of alcoholic beverages and HFSS food to 
children,
7
 it has nonetheless recognised that the excessive consumption of such 
products, fuelled in part by highly effective marketing campaigns, is a cause for 
concern and has therefore introduced both quantitative and qualitative restrictions on 
                                                          
4
 Directive 89/552 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by Law, 
Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of 
television broadcasting activities [1989] OJ L298/23. 
5
 WHO Regional Office for Europe, Action Plan for implementation of the European 
Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases 2012−2016, 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/170155/e96638.pdf, p.1 [All 
Internet links mentioned in this paper were last accessed on February 6, 2013]. 
6
 See WHO, 2008-2013 Action Plan for the Global Strategy for the Prevention and 
Control of Non Communicable Diseases (2008) 
http://www.who.int/nmh/publications/9789241597418/en/, p. 5. 
7
 By contrast, commercial communications for tobacco and medicinal products and 
treatments available only on prescription are strictly prohibited: see Article 9(1) (d) 
and (f) respectively. 
their marketing as part of the EU strategies on obesity prevention
8
 and alcohol-related 
harm.
9
 
 
This article assesses the effectiveness of these restrictions. After reviewing the 
evidence base supporting a limitation of the marketing of HFSS food and alcoholic 
beverages to children (1), it discusses the provisions of the AVMS Directive dealing 
specifically with alcohol and food marketing (2), replacing them within the broader 
context of the Directive (3) and current EU strategies on consumer protection and 
fundamental rights (4). It concludes that the existing EU regulatory framework is not 
sufficiently robust to protect children from the harmful effects of HFSS food and 
alcohol marketing and makes tentative suggestions on what the EU should consider 
doing to strengthen the protection of children’s health from such marketing. 
 
The relationship between marketing, consumption and health 
 
Advertising restrictions have always given rise to vivid controversies reflecting the 
strongly polarised views of different stakeholders on the role which the marketing of 
certain goods has played on their consumption and, in turn, on diets and health. In 
light of their particular vulnerability to marketing, attention has tended to focus on 
children. For years, consumer and public health associations have highlighted that the 
exposure of children to the marketing of unhealthy products such as alcoholic 
beverages or HFSS food has had a negative impact on their health and have therefore 
called for its strict regulation. By contrast, the opponents of regulation have argued 
that restrictions on marketing violate the fundamental right of commercial operators 
to promote their goods, services and brands. Thus, any restrictions on marketing need 
to be preceded by a proportionality assessment based on evidence in order to 
reconcile these divergent points of view.  
 
It is true that commercial expression is viewed as a form of expression and, as such, 
benefits from the protection granted by Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which provides in its first paragraph that “everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
                                                          
8
 European Commission, A Strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity 
Related Health Issues COM(2007) 279 final. For more information on the EU 
Nutrition and Physical Activity Strategy, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/policy/index_en.htm. For an 
extensive commentary, see A. Garde, EU Law and Obesity Prevention (Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010). 
9
 European Commission, An EU Strategy to Support Member States in Reducing 
Alcohol Related Harm COM(2006) 625 final. For more information on the EU 
Alcohol Strategy, see: http://ec.europa.eu/health/alcohol/policy/index_en.htm  
regardless of frontiers”. Drawing on the case law of the US Supreme Court,10 the 
European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this provision broadly to the effect 
that it protects all forms of expression, including commercial expression consisting of 
the provision of information, expression of ideas or communication of images as part 
of the promotion of a commercial activity and the concomitant right to receive such 
communications.11 Nevertheless, the right to free expression is not absolute: public 
authorities may restrict commercial speech for reasons of overriding public interest, 
including the protection of public health. To do so, however, they must establish that 
the restriction is proportionate, i.e. that it is both legitimate and no more restrictive 
than necessary to address specific public health concerns.
12
 The Court of Justice of 
the European Union explicitly relied on this case law in its two Tobacco Advertising 
judgments
13
 and in its Karner ruling.
14
 The Court’s recent Deutsches Weintor15 and 
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 In Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Consumer Council (1976) 425 US 748, the 
Supreme Court stated: “the free dissemination of commercial information allows 
businesses to promote their goods and services, while offering the possibility to 
consumers of being informed about the goods and services in question, which may in 
turn lead to increased competition between manufacturers and service providers. The 
underlying assumption is that if a product or a service is lawfully available on the 
market, consumers should be able to know about it so that they can decide which one 
to choose among competing products and services.” For a discussion of this case law, 
see A. Garde, “Freedom of Commercial Expression and the Protection of Public 
Health in Europe” (2010) 12 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 225. 
11 See in particular Markt Intern v Germany Series A no 165 (1990) 12 E.H.R.R. 161; 
Groppera v Switzerland Series A no 173 (1990) 12 E.H.R.R. 321; and Casado Coca v 
Spain Series A no 285 (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 1; Krone Verlag v Austria (2006) 42 
E.H.R.R. 28. 
12
 Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly states that 
the right of commercial operators to promote their goods and services may be limited: 
“The exercise of [the freedoms to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas], since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary”.  
13
 Case C-376/98 Germany v Council and the European Parliament [2000] E.C.R. I-
8419 and Case C-380/03 Germany v Council and the European Parliament [2006] 
E.C.R. I-11573. 
14
 Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] E.C.R. I-3025. 
15
 Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor [2012] E.C.R. I-xxx, 6 September 2012, not yet 
reported. 
Sky Österreich
16
 judgments, discussed below, have confirmed that the EU legislature 
is entitled to give priority, in the necessary balancing of the rights and interests at 
issue, to overriding requirements of public interests over private economic interests.  
 
Evidence linking food advertising to increased HFSS food consumption 
 
Up to a few years ago, the food industry tended to argue that food marketing 
restrictions were not legitimate because marketing did not, as such, contribute to 
childhood obesity. If children were overweight, it was because they were not 
sufficiently active and because they snacked whilst watching television or surfing the 
Internet. Therefore the first question that arises when envisaging restrictions on food 
marketing to children is whether exposure to HFSS food marketing does contribute to 
childhood obesity.  
 
As one of the EU Member States with the highest levels of childhood overweight and 
obesity, the UK has been at the forefront of obesity research. In particular, several 
public authorities have commissioned independent research to determine the influence 
that food marketing has on children’s choices, preferences, consumption and 
behaviour. In 2003, the Food Standards Agency commissioned a report which 
concluded that television advertising led to an increase in consumption not only of the 
product of a given brand, but also of all the products of the category in question.
17
 In 
other words, not only will children prefer Coca-Cola to Pepsi if they see an 
advertisement for the former, but they will also increase their consumption of fizzy 
sugary drinks to the detriment of other categories of drinks such as water, milk or fruit 
juices.
18
 
 
Similarly, the independent regulator for the UK communication industries, Ofcom, 
commissioned research into the role played by television advertising in influencing 
children’s consumption of unhealthy food. The report concluded that advertising had 
a modest, direct effect on children’s food choices and a larger but unquantifiable 
indirect effect on children’s food preferences, consumption and behaviour.19 On this 
                                                          
16
 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich [2013] E.C.R. I-xxx, 22 January 2013, not yet 
reported. 
17
 G. Hastings et al., “Review of Research on the Effects of Food Promotion to 
Children” (University of Strathclyde, 2003) 
http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/foodpromotiontochildren1.pdf. 
18
 This review has been regularly updated. The latest update was commissioned by the 
World Health Organisation: G. Hastings et al., The Extent, Nature and Effects of Food 
Promotion to Children: A Review of the Evidence to December 2008 (WHO, 2009) 
http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/Evidence_Update_2009.pdf. 
19
 Sonia Livingstone produced three reports for Ofcom on the effects of food 
advertising (February 2004, May 2004 and January 2006). They are all available at 
basis, while noting the multiple factors accounting for childhood obesity, Ofcom 
acknowledged that there was a case for proportionate and targeted action in relation to 
television advertising to address this public health issue. This research constituted the 
basis for the imposition of a ban on all HFSS food marketing in and around children’s 
television programmes in the UK.  
 
The relationship between food marketing and children’s diets has more recently been 
recognised at global level. In particular, in Resolution WHA63.14 of May 2010, the 
Sixty-third World Health Assembly approved a set of WHO recommendations on the 
marketing of food to children calling for a ban on all HFSS food marketing to 
children.
20
 
 
Evidence of a relationship between the marketing of alcoholic beverages 
and their excessive consumption 
 
Similarly, the WHO Global strategy to reduce the harmful effects of alcohol, also 
endorsed by the Sixty-third World Health Assembly in May 2010, has recognised the 
growing evidence linking the marketing of alcoholic beverages with their excessive 
consumption and the increased probability of developing an NCD.
21
  
 
Studies have shown, with reference to children and young people, that there is indeed 
a positive relationship between exposure to alcohol advertising and the likelihood of 
consuming alcohol frequently and heavily. The Science Group
22
 of the European 
Alcohol and Health Forum
23
 conducted a wide ranging review of a variety of these 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.ofcom.org.uk. Her findings are summarised in S. Livingstone, “Does TV 
Advertising Make Children Fat: What the Evidence Tells Us?” (2006) 13 Public 
Policy Research 54.  
20
 The Recommendations, the Framework Implementation Report interpreting their 
provisions (2012) and all other WHO documents on food marketing to children are 
available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/marketing-food-to-
children/en/index.html.  
21
 Resolution WHA 63.13 notes that “reducing the impact of marketing, particularly 
on young people and adolescents, is an important consideration in reducing harmful 
use of alcohol”: WHO, Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol (2010) 
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/alcstratenglishfinal.pdf. 
22
 An advisory group composed of independent experts on alcohol policy. The list of 
members is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/alcohol/docs/science_list_2010_en.pdf. 
23
 The Forum is a body set up pursuant to the EU Alcohol Strategy and is, according 
to its founding Charter 
(http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/alcohol/documents/Alcohol_ch
studies and delivered an Opinion in 2009 which concluded that there was “consistent 
evidence to demonstrate an impact of alcohol advertising on the uptake of drinking 
among non-drinking young people”.24 Other systematic reviews of studies have found 
similar results. According to Smith and Foxcroft, “the effect was consistent across 
studies … a dose response between amount of exposure and frequency of drinking 
was clearly demonstrated”.25 Meier also concluded that “regardless of their explicit 
intention there is evidence for an effect of alcohol advertisements on underage 
drinkers”.26 Thus the evidence base for the effect of marketing on youth drinking 
supports the existence of a positive relationship between marketing and 
consumption.
27
 
 
Research findings that marketing for alcoholic beverages and HFSS food negatively 
influences children’s choices, preferences, consumption and behaviour therefore 
prevent industry operators from arguing that marketing practices have had no role to 
play in growing NCD burdens. Thus, the question is not whether a regulatory 
intervention is legitimate, but how it should be tailored to protect children effectively 
from harmful media influences on their health whilst allowing the industry to promote 
goods and services which they have lawfully placed on the market.  
 
Complicating factors 
 
The difficulties facing public authorities entrusted with carrying out the necessary 
proportionality assessment are compounded by the fact that the impact of marketing 
on children’s health is extremely difficult to quantify. This problem results from at 
least two factors. Firstly, regulating marketing is only part of the overall equation to 
reduce the burden of NCDs. Developing evidence-based NCD prevention strategies is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
arter2007.pdf) intended to provide “a common platform for all interested stakeholders 
at EU level that pledge to step up actions relevant to reducing alcohol-related harm”. 
24
 Science Group of the European Alcohol and Health Forum, “Does marketing 
communication impact on the volume and patterns of consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, especially by young people? – a review of longitudinal studies” (2009) 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/alcohol/Forum/docs/science_o0
1_en.pdf. 
25
 L. Smith and D. Foxcroft, “The effect of alcohol advertising, marketing and 
portrayal on drinking behaviour in young people: systematic review of prospective 
cohort studies” (2009) 9 B.M.C. Public Health 51. 
26
 P. Meier, “Independent review of the effects of Alcohol pricing and promotion: Part 
A: Systematic Reviews” (2008) 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalass
et/dh_091383.pdf, section 2.7. 
27
 Further studies subsequent to the Opinion of the Science Group which provide 
corroborating evidence include for instance M. Morgenstern et al., “Exposure to 
alcohol advertising and teen drinking” (2011) 52 Preventative Medicine 146, 149. 
a complex task for policy makers, as nutrition and alcohol policies can only be 
effective if they adopt a comprehensive multi-sectoral approach reflecting the 
multiplicity of the root causes of NCDs. As the UN General Assembly noted in its 
Declaration on NCDs of September 2011:  
 
“[T]he conditions in which people live, poverty, uneven distribution of wealth, 
lack of education, social, gender, political, behavioural and environmental 
determinants of health are all contributory factors to the prevalence of 
NCDs.”28  
 
Tackling them requires the integration of policies across the policy spectrum. There is 
no magic bullet, and although regulating marketing to children must be seen as part of 
the solution, it is still only one part of the solution.  
 
Secondly, most of the research carried out to date has tended to focus on the influence 
of television advertising, whilst children have become exposed to a growing number 
and range of commercial messages which extend far beyond traditional media 
advertising and which involve activities such as online marketing, sponsorship and 
peer-to-peer marketing.
29
 The problem is made more acute by the fact that certain 
marketing techniques, including the use of cartoon or licensed characters, have been 
specifically developed to seduce young audiences,
30
 and that companies tend to use 
“integrated marketing communications”’, in which promotional activities range across 
different media platforms, often blurring the distinction between promotional and 
other content.
31
 A Recent report from RAND Europe on young people’s exposure to 
                                                          
28
 See the Political Declaration of the High Level Meeting on the Prevention and 
Control of NCDs (A/66/L.1) which the UN General Assembly adopted unanimously 
on 19-20 September 2011: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/L.1. 
29
 D. Buckingham, “The Impact of the Commercial World on Children’s Wellbeing” 
(Department for Children, Schools and Families and Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport, 2009), 
https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/standard/publicationDetail/Page1/DCSF-
00669-2009. 
30
 See in particular J. McGinnis, J. Gootman and V. Kraak, Food Marketing to 
Children and Youth: Threat or Opportunity? (Washington: Institute of Medicine 
2006) and J. Harris, M. Schwartz and K. Brownell, “Marketing Foods to Children and 
Adolescents: Licensed Characters and other Promotions on Packaged Foods in the 
Supermarket” (2009), 13 Public Health Nutrition 409. 
31 
Buckingham, “The Impact of the Commercial World on Children’s Wellbeing” 
https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/standard/publicationDetail/Page1/DCSF-
00669-2009. For a recent analysis of the development of integrated marketing 
communication strategies in the food sector, see the US Institute of Medicine, 
alcohol marketing highlighted the realities of this problem by revealing that through 
their high use of social media, which often relies on alternative content such as 
competitions and games to draw viewers in, young people are exposed to quite a high 
proportion of alcohol advertising, interacting with both marketer- and user-generated 
content on the same website.
32
 In light of this increasingly complex media 
environment, it is worth bearing in mind the distinction which the WHO 
Recommendations on food marketing to children have drawn between the exposure of 
children to marketing (how much marketing to children?) and the power of marketing 
(what type of techniques work specifically well with children?). As the effectiveness 
of marketing is determined by these two components,
33
 a comprehensive approach 
tackling both exposure and power has the highest potential to achieve the desired 
impact.
34
 
 
The provisions of the AVMS Directive and their loopholes 
 
As a result of the accumulated evidence on the negative effect that marketing for 
alcoholic beverages and HFSS food has on children’s consumption patterns and 
health, the EU has recognised that the marketing of such products should be 
regulated.  However, the provisions it has adopted to date are disappointing, to say the 
least.
35
 
 
Commercial communications for alcoholic beverages 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“Challenges and opportunities for change in food marketing to children and youth: 
Workshop summary” (National Academies Press, 2013). 
32
 E Winpenny et al., “Assessment of young people’s exposure to alcohol marketing 
in audiovisual and online media” (RAND Europe, 2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/alcohol/docs/alcohol_rand_youth_exposure_marketing_en.
pdf. 
33
 Recommendation 2: “Given that the effectiveness of marketing is a function of 
exposure and power, the overall policy objective should be to reduce both the 
exposure of children to, and power of, marketing of foods high in saturated fats, 
trans-fatty acids, free sugars, or salt”. 
34
 Explanatory Paragraph 17 accompanying Recommendation 3 on Policy 
Development.    
35
 This article does not discuss more general provisions focusing on advertising to 
children and advertising detrimental to health, and it does not discuss the quantitative 
restrictions which the AVMS Directive has imposed on audiovisual communications. 
On these provisions, see O. Castendyk, E. Dommering and A. Scheuer European 
Media Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008) and J. Harrison 
and L. Woods European Broadcasting Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
Despite the good intentions expressed in the EU Alcohol Strategy “to consider further 
actions to curb under-age drinking and harmful drinking patterns among youth”,36 it is 
clear that the two provisions of the AVMS Directive applying directly to alcohol 
marketing – Article 9(1) (e) and Article 22 – are neither specific nor strong enough to 
protect children from the harmful influence of alcohol marketing on their health. 
 
Article 9(1) (e) applies to all forms of commercial communications for alcoholic 
beverages, stating that such communications “shall not be aimed specifically at 
minors and shall not encourage immoderate consumption of such beverages”. This 
wording suggests that despite the mounting evidence on the relationship between 
alcohol marketing and children’s drinking habits, Article 9(1) (e) does not prohibit 
audiovisual media commercial communications for alcoholic beverages from being 
shown to children.
37
 The requirement is that they must not specifically be aimed at 
them. Thus, “advertisements for such products could be broadcast right before, after 
or during children’s programmes without being considered as specifically aimed at 
minors”, notwithstanding the fact that they would reach a high number of children.38 
The consequences of this state of affairs are reflected in sobering research findings 
which show that in some Member States children are just as likely if not more likely 
to be exposed to alcohol advertising than adults.
39
 Furthermore, although it is a key 
term used in the both Article 9(1) (e) and Article 22, there is no definition of 
“immoderate consumption” anywhere in the Directive, not even a qualitative one. 
Immoderate consumption is supposedly the very thing that the rules are trying to 
prevent, especially with regard to children who are targeted by the alcohol industry as 
potential future heavy drinkers and reliable customers, however there are no common 
guidelines as to the level of consumption that an advertisement must suggest or 
portray before it is considered immoderate. The interpretation of the term is left to the 
Member States. Due to different cultural approaches to alcohol in each Member State 
                                                          
36
European Commission, An EU Strategy to Support Member States in Reducing 
Alcohol Related Harm COM(2006) 625 final, p. 7. 
37
 We have referred to “children” throughout, even though the AVMS Directive refers 
to “minors” in relation to alcohol marketing and “children” in relation to food 
marketing. Neither of these terms is defined in the Directive itself and the age of 
majority varies between Member States.  
38
 Castendyk, Dommering and Scheuer, European Media Law, 2008, 600. 
39
 Winpenny et al., “Assessment of young people’s exposure to alcohol marketing” 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/alcohol/docs/alcohol_rand_youth_exposure_marketing_en.
pdf. The WHO Framework for alcohol policy states that “all children and adolescents 
have the right to grow up in an environment protected from the negative 
consequences of alcohol consumption and, to the extent possible, from the promotion 
of alcoholic beverages” (WHO, Framework for alcohol policy in the WHO European 
Region 2006, p. 23). Declining to expressly prohibit the marketing of alcohol to 
children, whether direct or indirect, is arguably a retreat from the commitment to this 
principle. 
the “level of socially accepted moderacy”40 varies greatly. For example, some states 
may consider it acceptable for an advertisement to show a large numbers of empty 
bottles the day after a party while other states would not,
41
 thus opening the door to 
differing standards of protection against irresponsible alcohol marketing campaigns 
that attempt to instil positive attitudes towards heavy drinking at an early age. 
 
Whereas Article 9(1) (e) applies to all forms of audiovisual media communications, 
Article 22 applies to television advertising only. Contrary to the claim made in the 
first report on the application of the AVMS Directive, which describes Article 22 as 
containing “detailed requirements”, 42  the wording contained in Article 22 is 
generalised and constitutes no more than what could be regarded as common sense. It 
is therefore unsurprising that most Member States have exceeded the level of 
protection offered in the Directive, as discussed below.
43
  Even when a comparison is 
made to self-imposed industry regulatory codes, the generality of Article 22 is 
revealed. For example, the Portman Group Code of Conduct is a UK self-regulatory 
code devised by the industry for ensuring that its members promote alcohol in a 
socially responsible manner. Its purpose is therefore similar to that of Article 22. 
However, it consists of eleven provisions, compared to six in Article 22, and its 
requirements are broader and go further than those in the Directive. For instance, Rule 
3 (2) (g) requires that promotions for alcoholic beverages must not “urge the 
consumer to drink rapidly or to ‘down’ a product in one”44 – this finds no equal in the 
Directive. Moreover, Rule 3(2) (d) states that a drink, its packaging and any 
promotional material must not directly or indirectly “suggest any association with 
sexual success”, whereas the AVMS Directive uses the less strongly worded phrase 
“shall not create the impression that the consumption of alcohol contributes towards 
… sexual success”. One could therefore argue that the provisions of Article 22 are 
basic even compared to what the industry concedes to be necessary.  
 
The root of the problem when it comes to marketing to children is that neither Article 
9(1) (e) nor Article 22 make an attempt to address the creative techniques that make 
communications for alcoholic beverages appealing to children. There is no mention of 
                                                          
40
 Castendyk, Dommering and Scheuer, European Media Law, 2008, 596. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 European Commission, First Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on the application of Directive 2010/13/EU “Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive” COM(2012) 203 final, p. 7. 
43
 See the European Commission’s First Report on the Application of the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive, which indicates that 22 Member States of 27 have 
implemented more detailed provisions, p. 7. 
44
 At p. 7. The Portman Code is available at 
http://www.portmangroup.org.uk/assets/documents/Code%20of%20practice%204th%
20Edition.pdf. 
youth culture, humour, cartoons, or childish behaviour, all of which have been shown 
to make alcohol advertising appealing to a youth audience.
45
 The aspects that are 
mentioned are however easily circumvented. For example, one study points out that:  
 
“[W]hile many codes restrict the use of young people in advertisements, 
having them present is not necessary for an advertisement to be appealing to 
under-age drinkers.”46 
 
Thus, alcohol companies are still able to produce commercial communications that 
appeal strongly to children without infringing the rules in the AVMS Directive – 
although the Directive may prohibit the use of certain elements and concepts, the 
subtlety of modern marketing methods means that when direct exhortations are 
prohibited the same message can be just as effectively communicated through 
association, suggestion and appealing to core aspects of youth culture.  
 
The Commission itself has indirectly acknowledged this problem in its first 
application report on the AVMS Directive:  
 
“[V]ery few cases of clear infringements have been found. However, a 
significant proportion, more than 50% of the advertising spots, contained 
elements which might be linked to some of the characteristics banned by the 
AVMS Directive, although in view of the detailed requirements of the AVMS 
Directive they fell short of constituting a clear cut infringement.”47  
 
Commercial communications for HFSS food 
 
The EU’s commitment to protect children from HFSS food marketing is even weaker 
than it is for alcoholic beverages. Article 9(2) of the AVMS Directive was specifically 
adopted to respond to childhood obesity concerns and provides that: 
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“Member States and the Commission shall encourage media service providers 
to develop codes of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial 
communication, accompanying or included in children’s programmes, of 
[HFSS food].” 
 
Although it is welcome that Article 9(2) recognises the negative influence of HFSS 
food marketing on children’s dietary choices, its scope is nevertheless strictly 
circumscribed and this raises serious doubts as to the provision’s effectiveness. First, 
the wording of Article 9(2) is unclear. In particular, the phrase “inappropriate 
audiovisual commercial communication” seems to leave the food industry with an 
important margin of discretion. One could argue that all forms of commercial 
communication for HFSS food directed at children are inappropriate.
48
 Nevertheless, 
this is not what a literal interpretation of Article 9(2) suggests. Rather, it implies that 
there are appropriate and inappropriate HFSS food adverts, thus putting the onus on 
the industry to tackle only the latter in its codes of conduct. One could imagine that 
using celebrities or cartoon characters would be viewed as inappropriate, as these 
techniques are particularly effective in diverting a child’s attention away from the 
actual product, whereas adverts that do not rely on these or similar techniques would 
not be regarded as “inappropriate”. Such an approach, apart from being ineffective, 
would be extremely cynical, as it would leave the industry with a broad margin of 
discretion in relation to the content of its codes of conduct. It would be comforting to 
believe that this provision was drafted somewhat inadvertently.   
 
Secondly, this provision only requires Member States and the Commission to 
“encourage” media service providers to develop codes of conduct on the advertising 
of unhealthy food to children and to monitor the fulfilment of this commitment. There 
is no duty to ensure either that such codes are indeed adopted or that they are 
sufficiently effective.
49
 
 
Thirdly, Article 9(2) only requires that media service providers limit inappropriate 
unhealthy food marketing “accompanying or included in children’s programming”. 
As stated above, however, the AVMS Directive does not define what is meant by 
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“children's programming”. Consequently, the EU Pledge, the main self-regulatory 
initiative which has been adopted to comply with Article 9(2), only applies when at 
least 35% of the audience is made of children of less than 12.
50
 This percentage, 
which has been lowered from 50%, remains extremely high and will leave a range of 
popular programmes with children outside the scope of the food industry’s 
commitment to abstain from advertising during children’s programmes. Alternatively, 
the EU could define a “watershed” – i.e. a time when the child audience is likely to be 
small and before which it is not allowed to promote HFSS food. This option would 
have the advantage of being potentially far more effective and easier to administer 
across the EU. The group of children to be protected by Article 9(2) is also left 
undefined. The EU Pledge applies a threshold of 12 years old. If it is generally 
accepted that children cannot fully grasp the commercial intent of advertising until the 
age of 11 or 12 and that children below 12 years of age must be protected, this does 
not mean that children who are more than 12 years old are unaffected by HFSS food 
marketing. Older children also respond to the persuasive intent of advertising.
51
 A 
decision thus needs to be taken on whether this is sufficient to protect them, as in the 
case of tobacco products or medicines and medicinal treatments available only on 
prescription. As the Commission has noted in its first application report on the AVMS 
Directive, “it does appear that advertising techniques geared towards minors are 
frequently used in television advertising”52 and that consequently more needs to be 
done. In particular, the Commission has stated that it will “support the development of 
stricter age and audience thresholds for advertising and marketing and more 
consistent nutritional benchmarks across companies”.53  If this statement does not 
resolve the issue,
54
 it goes some way towards acknowledging that the approach 
adopted to date has not been sufficiently protective of children. 
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54
 Determining the age is absolutely key to the debate; however this question remains 
unresolved to date. It is argued that it can only be addressed effectively on the basis of 
a careful proportionality analysis which stakeholders have to date largely failed to 
engage with.  
The scope of the definition of an “audiovisual commercial 
communication”  
 
Not only do the provisions in Articles 9(1) (e), 9(2) and 22 lack specificity, but they 
also fail to cover many promotional tools frequently used by industry operators to 
reach children. In particular, a range of potentially harmful promotions for alcoholic 
beverages and HFSS food may be excluded from the scope of the AVMS Directive 
because they do not constitute an “audiovisual commercial communication”, defined 
in the Directive as: 
 
“[I]mages with or without sound which are designed to promote, directly or 
indirectly, the goods, services, or images of a natural or legal entity pursuing 
an economic activity. Such images accompany or are included in a programme 
in return for payment or for similar consideration or for self-promotional 
purposes. Forms of audiovisual commercial communication include, inter alia, 
television advertising, sponsorship, teleshopping and product placement.”55 
  
If a communication is not offered in return for remuneration or self-promotional 
purposes, and does not accompany a programme, then it falls outside the scope of the 
AVMS Directive. For example, how would the website of a company selling 
alcoholic beverages fare under this definition?
56
 Although websites have been found 
to be powerful promotional tools for targeting children directly,
57
 it is unlikely that 
they will fall within the definition of an audiovisual commercial communication: even 
if they fulfil the condition of having a self-promotional purpose, it is difficult to argue 
that they “accompany or are included in a programme”.58  
  
Other examples of promotional content that is likely to fall outside the definition of an 
audiovisual commercial communication include viral emails that are designed to 
“gain credibility by making [them] seem as if the message is from a trustworthy 
friend”, 59  as well as Facebook “seeding” tactics of alcohol and food industry 
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operators.
60
 Both of these marketing strategies have the ability to reach large numbers 
of children.
61
 It is therefore of concern that many new forms of marketing fall outside 
the scope of the AVMS Directive, whilst not being adequately regulated by any other 
harmonising provisions of EU law, as discussed in section 4 below. 
 
The limits of self-regulation as an alternative to legally binding 
regulation 
 
The Commission has been very vocal in promoting the use of self-regulation at EU 
level by industry operators as an alternative to the adoption of legally binding rules to 
support healthier lifestyles.
62
  Its rationale for believing that self-regulatory schemes 
can supplement the AVMS Directive or even act as an alternative to tighter legal 
controls is that these schemes would have the potential to deliver more rapid 
responses to infringements, be more flexible so as to adapt to rapidly changing media 
environments and be more effective in view of the cooperation that would be 
established with public authorities to achieve better health outcomes for all, rather 
than alienate industry operators by imposing binding rules on them that they do not 
approve of. 
 
Such a belief is regrettably not founded on evidence.  A range of independent experts 
from the EU and beyond widely support the opposite view that self-regulation is not a 
suitable regulatory mechanism to protect children effectively from the harmful 
consequences that the marketing of HFSS food and alcoholic beverages has on their 
health.
63
 This should not come as a surprise. Self-regulation has inherent and arguably 
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 For a criticism of the use of self-regulation to limit the marketing of HFSS food and 
alcoholic beverages to children, see in particular: C. Hawkes, “Self-regulation of food 
advertising: What it can, could and cannot do to discourage unhealthy eating habits 
among children” (2005) British Nutrition Foundation, Nutrition Bulletin 374; D. 
Ludwig and M. Nestle, “Can the food industry play a constructive role in the obesity 
epidemic?” (2008) 15 JAMA 300; K Brownell and K Warner, “The perils of ignoring 
insurmountable weaknesses that mean that it will rarely act as an effective 
replacement for legislation. Clearly, “to defend the right to market alcohol [and HFSS 
foods] is essential business activity for the vested interests involved”, 64  and 
consequently any self-regulatory commitments will always be compromised. An 
inherent conflict of interest does arise when commercial operators are asked to 
voluntarily stop marketing to children whilst they have a primary responsibility 
towards their shareholders to increase their profits. Marketing is one of the most 
effective tools available to them to reach this objective and thus for both the food and 
the alcoholic beverages industries it has been an established commercial objective to 
actively target children as key marketing audiences.
65
 Consequently, asking the 
industries to self-regulate would amount to “putting Dracula in charge of a blood 
bank”.66  
 
If we review the commitments that HFSS food and alcoholic beverages industry 
operators have made – all of which are supposed to share the common objective of 
reducing the exposure of children to alcohol and HFSS food marketing – one cannot 
but conclude that they have failed to respond effectively to concerns related to 
growing obesity rates and harmful drinking patterns among children. This can be 
observed firstly in the fact that the majority of self-regulatory norms relating to the 
marketing of alcoholic beverages have focused on content-based regulation, which is 
far easier for industry operators to manipulate than volume-based regulation, thus 
ensuring that advertising elements likely to entice children that are not caught by the 
AVMS Directive are also not caught by the relevant codes. A report produced by the 
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AMMIE project examining the alcohol advertising codes of several Member states 
observes: 
 
“Elements included in alcohol advertising campaigns that are, according to 
our youth panels, part of the youth culture, were not identified as such by 
Advertising Code Committee. Moreover, humour is an attractive style element 
to young people and yet is not addressed in the self-regulatory codes”.67  
 
The report even explicitly accuses the industry of manipulating the code, emphasising 
that these commitments are “clever and precisely formulated thus resulting in easily 
rejected complaints”,68 however in truth, many of the self-regulatory codes do no 
more than simply implement the insufficiently protective provisions already contained 
in the AVMS Directive, a convenient way for the industry to inconspicuously avoid 
tighter commitments.  
 
The pledges given by the industry as part of the EU Alcohol and Health Forum are 
even more cynically constructed. Of the 66 commitments on commercial 
communications, 53 have been made by alcohol producers. An examination of the 
content of these pledges reveals that at least 20 relate mainly to educational and 
informational aims rather than any concrete improvement on limiting the exposure of 
children to alcohol marketing. However, there is overall little evidence that 
educational programmes are at all effective in reducing the level of alcohol related 
harm.
69
 The remainder of the pledges are often disguised attempts to perpetuate the 
promotion of alcohol to minors. For instance, the EU Alcohol and Health Forum 
pledge made by the World Federation of Advertisers and a number of alcohol 
producers is to “promote the integration of the 70/30 rule into national self-regulatory 
codes and systems”.70 This pledge, while seeming constructive on its face, actually 
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works against the protection of minors, since as a Forum Task Force Mapping 
Exercise Document
71
 points out, if any percentage of an audience are minors this will 
fall short of achieving the aims of the EU Strategy, and as the AMMIE report points 
out,
72
 30 per cent of a given audience actually allows very high absolute numbers of 
children to be legitimately exposed to alcohol advertising which could encourage 
them to develop harmful drinking habits. A similar remark has been made above in 
relation to the EU Pledge on HFSS food marketing to children, which retains a 35/65 
threshold. The European Commission needs to recognise that if regulatory standards 
in the field of alcohol and HFSS food advertising are to be effective, the key policy 
parameters should be set by the competent regulatory authorities, in this instance the 
EU legislature, rather than industry operators, and they must be set in such a way as to 
avoid conflicts of interest.
73
 
 
Overall one can only conclude that the major loopholes contained in the provisions of 
the AVMS Directive have been exacerbated by the EU’s misplaced and dogmatic 
belief in the potential of self-regulation to supplement the existing legal regime in 
improving public health.  
 
The food and alcoholic beverages industries as two Goliaths of the EU’s 
economy 
 
An important explanation for the EU’s continued reluctance to regulate the marketing 
of HFSS food and alcoholic beverages rests on the power and influence that the food 
and alcohol industries possess and the tactics that they have employed to deflect any 
criticism of self-regulation as an effective regulatory mechanism. Food and drink 
operators comprise the second largest manufacturing industry in Europe, with 14.5% 
of total manufacturing turnover (EUR 917 billion for the EU-27), while employment 
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in this sector represents about 14% of the total manufacturing sector (about 310,000 
companies providing 4.8 million jobs).
74
  
The economic significance of the food and drink industries gives them a strong 
bargaining position and a powerful influence over political processes.
75
 To sustain 
these advantages there is a large amount of complicity between policy-makers and 
industry operators alike,
76
 leading to the “rise of the ‘unelected’ in policy making”,77 
and an infiltration of the political process that has given the industry an unquantifiable 
but certainly significant level of power. Both industries have been very well rewarded 
by the European Commission, the EU Alcohol and Health Forum and the EU 
Platform on Diet, Physical Activity and Health being largely “dominated by corporate 
interests”.78  
The food and alcohol industries have also recognised the importance, in order to 
protect their vested interest in “maintain[ing] the survival and advancement of their 
organisation”,79 of presenting an organised front. Within industries as large as alcohol 
and food there will evidently be divisions,
80
 however as a collective both industries 
realise that they must “form around a shared view of the preferred policy outcome and 
coordinate their advocacy activities”.81  To this end, there is evidence of an “industry 
playbook” that is promulgated by players, containing “at the heart of this strategy … a 
script built on values of personal responsibility”.82 The food and alcohol industries 
have promoted the rhetoric within media channels that the development of poor health 
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is a matter of individual choice, and that responsibility for the excessive consumption 
of alcoholic beverages and HFSS food lies not with them but with individuals who 
choose to consume their products. This tactic of blaming individuals is not in line 
with independent evidence explaining the rise of NCDs worldwide, and policy-
makers must be particularly vigilant against the orchestrated, constant attempts of 
industry operators to undermine the development of effective NCD prevention 
strategies. 
Furthermore, the food and alcohol industries have systematically used their power, 
their influence and the level of organisation they have acquired in pursuit of their 
preferred policy outcomes. One strategy that they have consistently used to this effect 
is to undermine scientific research on the harm that alcoholic beverages and HFSS 
foods can cause. A cynical view might be that “at worst, the industry’s scientific 
activities confuse public discussion of health issues and policy options”.83 However, 
evidence suggests that this is exactly what the food and alcohol industries aim to 
achieve, particularly when it comes to advertising, where for instance “the alcohol 
industry have used selected econometric findings to bolster their, entrenched, position 
that advertising does not influence demand for alcohol”.84 Public policy makers must 
react accordingly and treat industry engagement with the evidence base as inherently 
suspicious.   
As a result of their activities in attempting to evade regulation and restriction, the food 
and alcohol industries have encountered heavy criticism among the scientific and 
public health community. Nevertheless, the EU legislature has yet to take this 
criticism on board. 
Perhaps the biggest accusation levied at the industry is that they have become a 
“disease vector”. 85  Unfortunately, the “broader lessons from tobacco have been 
implicitly rejected”,86 leaving the vector concept under researched and thus side lined 
in policy considerations relating to alcoholic beverages and HFSS food. The 
invitation given to the alcohol and food industries to sit at the policy table, and the 
incessant pursuit of self-regulatory solutions seem to ignore both the criticism of the 
food and alcohol industries as vectors of disease and the criticism already mentioned 
above that the ﬁduciary responsibilities of all corporations to maximize proﬁts 
regardless of health consequences constitute an inherent limit to the compatibility of 
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industry interests with public health.
87
 Some have been forthright in arguing that the 
engagement of industry with public health initiatives is nothing more than a 
“smokescreen”88 to cover up further brand promotion, whilst others have gone as far 
as suggesting that “moral jeopardy”89 is generated when public health agencies are 
directly exposed to the industry. It is therefore all the more regrettable, in light of 
these criticisms, that the food and alcohol industries continue to be courted by policy-
makers, not least the European Commission.  
 
Combining a clause of minimum harmonisation with the state of 
establishment principle 
 
The AVMS Directive sets up an interesting regulatory mechanism combining a clause 
of minimum harmonisation with the State of Establishment principle.  
 
The clause of minimum harmonisation 
 
Under Article 4 of the AVMS Directive, Member States are “free to require media 
service providers under their jurisdiction to comply with more detailed or stricter 
rules”. In light of the failure of the EU to act on existing evidence concerning the 
relationship between HFSS food and alcohol marketing and children’s health, several 
Member States have relied on this provision to exceed the minimum level of 
protection that the AVMS Directive provides. Some Member States have decided to 
ban advertising to children entirely for all goods and services, as Sweden has done 
since 1991.
90
 Of the other Member States, a broad spectrum of approaches can be 
observed, focusing either on exposure or on power, or on both components of 
marketing.  
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A multitude of national laws has been adopted on the protection of children from 
alcohol advertising.
91
 For example, France has opted to ban all alcohol advertising on 
television and in cinemas, and has also prohibited the sponsorship of cultural and 
sporting events by alcohol producers. Where advertising is allowed in other media 
forms such as the adult press, radio and billboards, it is subject to strict controls – 
communications must only refer to objective qualities of the products and must carry 
a health message.
92
 Other Member States have taken a less restrictive approach while 
still offering more protection than the AVMS Directive. For instance in Ireland, the 
statutory scheme in place not only mirrors Article 22 of the AVMS Directive but also 
bans both commercial communications for beverages of 25% alcohol by volume and 
those for ready-to-drink products such as alcopops.
93
 These statutory provisions are 
supported by a self-regulatory code on alcohol advertising that contains restrictions on 
the use of youth culture, ‘treatments’ likely to appeal to children and characters that 
would have particular appeal to children.
94
  
 
One can also observe significant discrepancies from one Member State to another 
concerning the regulation of HFSS food marketing.
95
 For example, Ofcom in the UK 
has introduced a ban on the scheduling of HFSS food advertising in or around 
programmes aimed at children (including pre-school children), or in or around 
programmes likely to be of particular appeal to children aged 4 to 15.
96
 The UK has 
also banned the product placement for HFSS food and alcoholic beverages in all 
television programmes.
97
 Moreover, alongside these scheduling restrictions (relating 
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rules, which entered into force on 28 February 2011. The Guidance is not binding, as 
to exposure), the Advertising Standards Authority has introduced restrictions on the 
content of advertisements for HFSS food (power). Thus, the use of advertising 
techniques that are particularly effective on pre-school or primary school children is 
banned. These techniques include promotional offers such as free toys, nutritional and 
health claims, licensed characters and celebrities.
98
 Similarly, the Irish Children’s 
Advertising Code prohibits the use of celebrities or sport stars to promote HFSS food 
to children up to 18 years of age.
99
 By contrast, the discussions which led to the 
amendment of the French Public Health Code in 2004 did not result in a ban on HFSS 
food marketing to children but, instead, in the compulsory disclosure of health 
messages in all advertisements for such products.
100
 
 
Nevertheless, the freedom that Member States derive from Article 4 is limited by 
Articles 3(1) of the AVMS Directive as well as by the general Treaty provisions on 
free movement.  
 
The State of Establishment principle 
 
Article 3(1) requires that: 
 
“Member States shall ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict 
retransmissions on their territory of audiovisual media services from other 
Member States for reasons which fall within the fields coordinated by this 
Directive”. 
 
Under this provision, which is commonly referred to as the State of establishment 
principle, Member States may only impose standards exceeding the minimum level of 
protection laid down in the AVMS Directive on audiovisual media service providers 
established in their jurisdiction.
101
 They cannot do so on providers established in other 
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Member States, as these providers only need to comply with the law of the State in 
which they are established, not the law(s) of the other State(s) in which they 
transmit.
102
 This reflects the concern that a balance should be struck between the free 
movement imperative of the internal market and other imperatives of public interest 
such as consumer and public health protection.
103
 Thus, over 27 national standards 
have the potential to apply in the same Member State, depending on the place of 
establishment of the audiovisual media service provider transmitting its programme 
into its territory. Even if diversity is not problematic in itself, especially in areas 
where consumption patterns may vary significantly from one Member State to 
another, it becomes problematic if the common level of protection is not set at a 
sufficiently high level of protection across the EU and fails to reflect existing 
evidence, as is the case in relation to the provisions regulating the marketing of HFSS 
food and alcoholic beverages. This is most vividly illustrated when audiovisual media 
services are retransmitted from one Member State to another Member State with a 
higher level of protection, which is then prevented from enforcing its stricter 
standards even though the two countries share the same language and have strong 
cultural affinities which are likely to increase the movement of cross-border services 
(France and Belgium, Germany and Austria, the UK and Ireland…). It is therefore not 
surprising that in its Recommendations on food marketing to children the WHO has 
stressed the need to adopt effective cross-border standards.
104
 The EU has an 
important responsibility to ensure that the efforts of its Member States are not 
frustrated. This is even mandated by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.
105
   
 
The general free movement Treaty provisions 
 
The second limit imposed on the freedom of Member States to adopt stricter standards 
than the ones laid down in the AVMS Directive stem from the general Treaty 
provisions, and in particular Article 34 TFEU on the free movement of goods and 
Article 56 TFEU on the free movement of services. The case law of the Court of 
Justice on these two provisions has tended to leave a relatively broad margin of 
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discretion when public health concerns had prompted a Member State to restrict the 
marketing of certain goods and services. Thus, in Bacardi, the Loi Evin imposing a 
near total ban on alcohol advertising in France was challenged.106 After accepting that 
restrictions on the advertising of alcoholic beverages reflected public health concerns, 
the Court stated:  
 
“[R]ules on television advertising such as those at issue in the main 
proceedings are appropriate to ensure their aim of protecting public health. 
Furthermore, they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such an 
objective. They limit the situations in which hoardings advertising alcoholic 
beverages may be seen on television and are therefore likely to restrict the 
broadcasting of such advertising, thus reducing the occasions on which 
television viewers might be encouraged to consume alcoholic beverages.”107  
 
Thus, in this decision, the Court hardly discussed the proportionality of the measure, 
leaving a particularly broad, largely unfettered discretion to Member States.
108
 
Similarly, when requested to assess the compatibility of the Norwegian visual display 
ban on tobacco products, the EFTA Court ruled that review of proportionality and of 
the effectiveness of the measures taken relied on findings of fact which the national 
court was in a better position to make.
109
 It concluded: 
 
“[I]t is for the national court to identify the aims which the legislation at issue 
is actually intended to pursue and to decide whether the public health 
objective of reducing tobacco use by the public in general can be achieved by 
measures less restrictive than a visual display ban on tobacco products.”110 
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Even though the EFTA Court stated that the national authorities needed to 
demonstrate that they had complied with the principle of proportionality,
111
 it did not 
prove willing to check whether the Norwegian authorities had done so when adopting 
the contested measures.
112
 
 
The diversity resulting from the regulatory framework laid down in the AVMS 
Directive therefore becomes a problem not only from the point of view of consumer 
and public health protection, but also from the point of view of market integration.   
Overall, therefore, the AVMS Directive is a failure on both counts: it does not 
adequately contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and it does not 
ensure a sufficiently high level of consumer and public health protection. This 
conclusion becomes even more compelling if one replaces the provisions of the 
AVMS Directive within the broader EU framework of consumer and fundamental 
rights protection.  
 
The protection of children as particularly vulnerable consumers  
 
The EU regulatory framework of consumer protection explicitly acknowledges that 
children are particularly vulnerable consumers who deserve specific protection from 
harmful commercial practices. The provisions of the AVMS Directive discussed 
above somewhat reflect this view in that they contain provisions regulating marketing 
to children, as opposed to the public at large. However, as these provisions are not 
sufficiently effective in protecting children, the question arises whether any other EU 
legislative instruments offer a satisfactory alternative. We will briefly consider the 
Unfair Commercial Practices (UCP) Directive and the E-Commerce Directive, before 
considering the EU fundamental rights agenda. 
 
The Unfair Commercial Practices and E-Commerce Directives 
 
The UCP Directive regulates business-to-consumer commercial practices, the 
definition of which encompasses “commercial communications including advertising 
and marketing”. 113  However, there are a number of worrying flaws in the UCP 
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 Article 2(d) of Directive 2005/29 on unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market, [2005] OJ L149/22. It is true that the UCP Directive 
excludes from its scope health and safety concerns (Article 3(5)). It is nonetheless 
relevant to the argument as it covers all practices that are likely to have a substantial 
impact on the economic behaviour of consumers (Article 5). On the difficulties 
Directive that mean that it too cannot be relied upon to effectively protect children 
from harmful commercial practices promoting the consumption of HFSS food and 
alcoholic beverages.  
 
The first problem comes in the conception of the UCP Directive of what a vulnerable 
consumer is. Age is explicitly recognised as a factor of vulnerability: 
 
“Commercial practices which are likely to materially distort the economic 
behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of consumers who are 
particularly vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product because of 
their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader 
could reasonably be expected to foresee, shall be assessed from the 
perspective of the average member of that group.” 
 
Regrettably, the prospects that this provision may have offered are significantly 
reduced by the last sentence of this article: 
 
“This is without prejudice to the common and legitimate advertising practice 
of making exaggerated statements or statements which are not meant to be 
taken literally.”  
 
Such advertising, commonly known as “puffery” or “puffs”, should be one of the 
prime examples of advertising that a vulnerable consumer such as a child should be 
protected against, since it is precisely because of their increased credulity or young 
age that they are unable to avoid taking exaggerated statements literally.
114
 The value 
of “puff” advertising to, for example, an alcohol producer lies in the incredulous or 
amused reaction the viewer has to it and their then increased tendency to remember it. 
Such practices, while recognisable by adults, could be very dangerous to children 
since they are far less likely to recognise “puff” advertisements as attention grabbing 
embellishments upon reality and not reflections of it, especially if the exaggeration is 
a fairly mild one. Therefore the decision to exclude the practice of “puff” advertising 
from situations in which the vulnerable consumer benchmark could apply 
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considerably reduces the protection the Directive offers against alcohol and HFSS 
food marketing employing such techniques, especially since, as Article 5(3) itself 
points out, such techniques are common. Importantly, it reduces the effectiveness of 
the UCP Directive against advertising that has complied with the requirements of the 
AVMS Directive yet remains appealing to children, perhaps through the use of 
humour or references to youth culture. Advertising practices complying with the letter 
of the AVMS Directive might still be viewed as unfair exploitation of a vulnerable 
group under the UCP Directive, however the exclusion described above drastically 
reduces the scope for such a conclusion.  
 
A further problem with the vulnerable consumer benchmark in general, when bearing 
in mind the provisions of the AVMS Directive, is that Article 5(3) stipulates that a 
practice must distort the “economic behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of 
consumers” which suggests, as confirmed in Recital 18, that a practice must be aimed 
specifically at a particular group of consumers. It has already been noted above that 
under the AVMS Directive rules on alcohol advertising can still legally reach children 
without being specifically aimed at them. Such an advertisement would not only fail 
to be caught by the AVMS Directive, but it would also probably not stand to be 
assessed according to the vulnerable consumer test laid down in the UCP Directive. 
The difficulties are further compounded by the fact that children are not a 
homogenous group of consumers – children of 6 years old will react differently to 
advertising from children of 14 years old, due to different cognitive abilities. This is 
not to say, however, that the latter category of children does not need specific 
protection.  
 
Furthermore, and as the European Parliament noted in its 2010 report on the impact of 
advertising on consumer behaviour,
115
 the UCP Directive does not cover “hidden” 
internet advertising amounting to consumer-to-consumer, as opposed to business-to-
consumer, in the form of comments posted on social networks, forums and blogs, the 
content of which is difficult to distinguish from mere opinion. The development of 
such advertising is all the more worrying as in some cases “certain business operators 
finance directly or indirectly any action to encourage the dissemination of messages 
or comments appearing to emanate from consumers themselves when in reality these 
messages are of an advertising or commercial nature”.116 The Parliament also voiced 
its concern about “the routine use of behavioural advertising and the development of 
intrusive advertising practices (such as reading the content of emails, using social 
networks and geolocation, and retargeted advertising), which constitute attacks on 
consumers’ privacy”.117 
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Regrettably, the E-Commerce Directive does not alleviate these concerns.
118
 As it is 
primarily intended to ensure the free flow of information society services between the 
Member States, including on-line advertising, one may have hoped that its provisions 
would have provided a degree of protection in areas not sufficiently well covered by 
the AVMS Directive, such as new or on-demand media popular with children. 
However, even a cursory examination of its provisions shows that it cannot make up 
for the shortcomings of the AVMS Directive. First, an information society service 
according to the Recitals is “any service normally provided for remuneration”, which 
means that the E-Commerce Directive will have the same problems in catching some 
important promotional tools as the AVMS Directive. Secondly, the provisions 
relevant to online advertising simply do not address the issue of the protection of 
children from harmful content. Articles 6 to 8, which deal specifically with 
commercial communications, only require that advertising and the advertiser be 
identifiable as such. Nothing of substance in the E-Commerce Directive therefore 
provides any extra measure of protection for children against the marketing of 
alcoholic beverages and HFSS food. 
 
The EU Consumer Strategy for 2014-2020 explicitly recognises that vulnerable 
consumers will need specific protection.
119
 Nevertheless, it does not attempt to 
determine who these vulnerable consumers may be and what specific protection they 
may require.
120
 In particular, if we look at the regulation of marketing to children, 
there is hardly anything at all to give us comfort. The Commission will determine 
whether new labelling rules are required for alcoholic beverages;
121
 it has also 
undertaken to report on whether the rules laid down in the UCP Directive are 
adequately enforced.
122
 There is no mention of the need to limit the exposure of 
children to marketing, and the marketing of alcoholic beverages and HFSS food more 
specifically. This is extremely disappointing. Not only does the EU framework fail to 
reflect existing evidence, but it also fails to comply with the rights-based rhetoric that 
EU institutions have endorsed in recent years. 
 
For a fundamental-rights based approach  
 
The knowledge that we have acquired from the EU’s tobacco litigation experience is 
that industry operators have tended to react quickly to the threat of marketing 
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restrictions by invoking fundamental rights, and in particular: Article 11 of the EU 
Charter on freedom of expression; Article 15 on the right to choose an occupation and 
the right to engage in work; Article 16 on the freedom to conduct a business; or 
Article 17 on the right to property.
123
 By contrast, public health and consumer 
advocates have been slow to embrace the fundamental rights discourse, even though 
this discourse offers great potential to strengthen the public health agenda they 
pursue.  
 
In two recent decisions, Deutsches Weintor
124
 and Sky Österreich,
125
 the Court rejected 
the rights-based arguments industry operators had put forward in order to protect their 
economic interests. In both cases, the Court concluded that the rights of commercial 
operators were not absolute and had to be balanced against competing fundamental 
rights also protected by the EU legal order. In particular, it clearly stated that the 
freedom to choose an occupation, the right to property and the freedom to conduct a 
business had to be considered in relation to their social function. Thus, restrictions 
may be imposed on the exercise of those rights and freedoms, provided that such 
restrictions are imposed by law, correspond to objectives of general interest pursued 
by the European Union and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing their very substance.
126
  
 
“Where several rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European 
Union legal order are at issue, the assessment of the possible disproportionate 
nature of a provision of European Union law must be carried out with a view 
to reconciling the requirements of the protection of those different rights and 
freedoms and a fair balance between them.”127  
 
Thus, in Sky Österreich, the Court held that the EU legislature could limit the freedom 
to conduct a business and the right to property “to give priority, in the necessary 
balancing of the rights and interests at issue, to public access to information over 
contractual freedom”.128    Similarly, and most interestingly for our purposes, the 
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Court specifically relied, in its Deutsches Weintor decision, on Article 35 of the EU 
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conclude that the EU legislature had not exceeded its margin of discretion by banning 
the use of health claims on all beverages containing more than 1.2% by volume of 
alcohol.
129
 This article is not the place to analyse the right to health.
130
 Suffice to say 
that a proportionality analysis would enable EU institutions to successfully invoke 
rights-based arguments to limit the marketing to children of alcoholic beverages and 
HFSS food far more strictly than they have done to date.
131
 This would also allow the 
Commission to reconcile its discourse on children’s rights with practice, closing an 
embarrassing gap.
132
 This depends, however, on whether the necessary political will 
is present. Unfortunately, the first application report on the AVMS Directive suggests 
that it clearly is not. The only commitment that the Commission has made is to 
“initiate necessary research in 2013” in order “to assess the impact of commercial 
communications, particularly for alcoholic beverages, on minors as regards exposure 
and consumption behaviour, and the effectiveness of the Directive’s restrictions in 
achieving the requisite protection”. 133  How much more evidence does the 
Commission need?  
 
Conclusion  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the EU has access to events of high interest to the public which are transmitted on an 
exclusive basis by a broadcaster established under their jurisdiction so that any 
broadcaster can choose short extracts to be used in general news programmes without 
being charged more than the additional costs directly incurred in providing access.   
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The difficulties involved in determining what constitutes a proportionate response to 
the growing burden of NCDs should not detract from the necessity of developing 
comprehensive rules on the marketing of alcoholic beverages and HFSS food. EU 
institutions must take stock of existing evidence and devise effective policies limiting 
the impact on children of alcohol and HFSS food marketing, reflecting the 
independent evidence that has accumulated over the years. This is particularly so as 
the budgets that public authorities have allocated to nutrition and responsible drinking 
education campaigns cannot match the budgets that food and alcoholic beverage 
operators devote to the promotion of their products to children. If NCD trends are to 
be reversed, the fundamental rights rhetoric should move away from the industry’s 
narrow focus on the right to free expression to a focus on other rights such as the right 
to health, the right to education, the right to information or the right to (nutritious) 
food.  
 
As Olivier de Schutter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, has stated:  
 
“[I]t is unacceptable that when lives are at stake, we go no further than soft, 
promotional measures that ultimately rely on consumer choice, without 
addressing the supply side of the food chain. Food advertising is proven to 
have a strong impact on children, and must be strictly regulated in order to 
avoid the development of bad eating habits early in life.”  
 
There is “no reason why the promotion of foods that are known to have detrimental 
health impacts should be allowed to continue unimpeded”.134 The same goes for the 
marketing of alcoholic beverages. Perhaps the EU institutions will, one day, seize the 
(red) bull by the horns… It could give them wings!  
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